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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
TERRY C. ANDERSON,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 44896
Bingham County Case No.
CR-2016-6737

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Issue
Has Anderson failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion, either by
imposing and ordering into execution a unified sentence of 10 years, with six years fixed, upon
his guilty plea to felony DUI, or by denying his Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence?

Anderson Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
Anderson pled guilty to felony DUI (prior felony DUI conviction within 15 years) and
the district court imposed a unified sentence of 10 years, with six years fixed, and ordered that
the sentence run consecutively to the sentence for his 2014 felony DUI. (R., pp.110, 161-64.)
Anderson filed a notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.185-87.) He
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also filed a timely Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence, which the district court denied.
(R., pp.170-73; Order Denying Rule 35 Motion (Augmentation).)
Anderson asserts that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive
sentence and ordering the sentence into execution rather than placing him on probation in light of
his substance abuse, desire for community-based treatment, and purported acceptance of
responsibility.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.4-11.)

Anderson has failed to establish an abuse of

discretion.
When evaluating whether a sentence is excessive, the court considers the entire length of
the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d
621, 628 (2016); State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008). It is presumed
that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement. State
v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 687, 391 (2007). Where a sentence is within statutory
limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.
McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (citations omitted). To carry this burden the appellant
must show the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Id. A sentence is
reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and
to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution. Id. The
district court has the discretion to weigh those objectives and give them differing weights when
deciding upon the sentence. Id. at 9, 368 P.3d at 629; State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 825, 965
P.2d 174, 185 (1998) (court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the objectives of
punishment, deterrence and protection of society outweighed the need for rehabilitation). “In
deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where
reasonable minds might differ.” McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting Stevens,
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146 Idaho at 148-49, 191 P.3d at 226-27). Furthermore, “[a] sentence fixed within the limits
prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion by the trial
court.” Id. (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982)).
A trial court's decision regarding whether imprisonment or probation is appropriate is
within its discretion. State v. Reber, 138 Idaho 275, 278, 61 P.3d 632, 635 (Ct. App. 2002)
(citations omitted); I.C. § 19-2601(4). The goal of probation is to foster the probationer's
rehabilitation while protecting public safety. State v. Cheatham, 159 Idaho 856, ___, 367 P.3d
251, 253 (Ct. App. 2016) (citations omitted). A decision to deny probation will not be deemed
an abuse of discretion if it is consistent with the criteria articulated in I.C. § 19-2521. Id. (citing
State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 567, 650 P.2d 707, 709 (Ct. App. 1982)). Pursuant to I.C. § 192521(1):
The court shall deal with a person who has been convicted of a crime
without imposing sentence of imprisonment unless, having regard to the nature
and circumstances of the crime and the history, character and condition of the
defendant, it is of the opinion that imprisonment is appropriate for protection of
the public because:
(a) There is undue risk that during the period of a suspended sentence or
probation the defendant will commit another crime; or
(b) The defendant is in need of correctional treatment that can be
provided most effectively by his commitment to an institution; or
(c) A lesser sentence will depreciate the seriousness of the defendant's
crime; or
(d) Imprisonment will provide appropriate punishment and deterrent to
the defendant; or
(e) Imprisonment will provide an appropriate deterrent for other persons
in the community; or
(f) The defendant is a multiple offender or professional criminal.
I.C. § 19-2521(1).
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The maximum prison sentence for felony DUI (prior felony DUI conviction within 15
years) is 10 years. I.C. §§ 18-8005(6), -8005(9). The district court imposed a unified sentence
of 10 years, with six years fixed, which falls well within the statutory guidelines. (R., pp.16164.) Anderson’s sentence is not excessive, nor is he a viable candidate for probation, in light of
his ongoing decisions to endanger others by driving while intoxicated and his failure to
rehabilitate while in the community.
Anderson’s criminal record demonstrates his disregard for the law, the terms of
community supervision, and the well-being of others. He was first convicted of forgery, for
which he completed a period of retained jurisdiction. (PSI, pp.4-5. 1) He was subsequently
convicted of failure to purchase a driver’s license, possession of drug paraphernalia, resisting or
obstructing officers, and failure to display two license plates before incurring his first DUI
charge in Bannock County on December 23, 1995, of which he was later convicted. (PSI, pp.56.) Anderson acquired another DUI charge on December 30, 1995, in Bingham County, which
was later dismissed. (PSI, p.6.) In January 1996, he committed a DUI in conjunction with
fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer in Bingham County; he was convicted of both
crimes and completed a second period of retained jurisdiction, after which he was placed on
probation. (PSI, p.6.) Anderson committed (and was later convicted of) petit theft within five
months of his placement on probation. (PSI, p.7.) He subsequently violated his probation in the
Bingham County attempt to elude case, but was continued on probation on May 4, 1998. (PSI,
p.7.)
Less than two months later, Anderson went to Wyoming, where committed (and was
convicted of) the new crimes of DUI, buying or receiving stolen property, and aggravated assault
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with a deadly weapon. (PSI, pp.7-8, 13.) Following his return to Idaho, Anderson’s probation
was revoked in the attempt to elude case and he was incarcerated in the penitentiary until 2001.
(PSI, pp.8, 13.) In 2001, he was charged with DWP, aggravated DUI, and felony possession of a
controlled substance; he was ultimately convicted of a reduced charge of failure to purchase a
driver’s license and of the felony possession of a controlled substance, for which he was
committed to the Department of Correction. (PSI, pp.8-9, 13.) Anderson accumulated multiple
DOR’s while in prison and eventually topped out his sentence in 2007. (PSI, p.13.)
In 2008, Anderson committed (and was later convicted of) another DUI in Wyoming.
(PSI, p.9.) In January 2009, he was charged – in Bannock County, Idaho – with DUI, DWP,
providing false information to an officer, and open container. (PSI, p.9.) While those charges
were pending, Anderson incurred additional charges for DWP and failure to provide proof of
insurance in Bannock County in April 2009, followed by yet another DUI in Wyoming in July
2009. (PSI, pp.9-10.) By December 2009, Anderson had once again returned to Idaho and was
charged with possession of a controlled substance. (PSI, p.10.) Of the 2009 charges, Anderson
was ultimately convicted of two DUI’s, DWP, failure to purchase a driver’s license (reduced
from DWP), open container, and possession of a controlled substance – with disposition dates
ranging from October 2009 to August 2013. (PSI, pp.9-10.)
Between 2010 and 2013, Anderson committed, and was convicted of, another possession
of a controlled substance, another DUI, two DWP’s, and failure to purchase a driver’s license
(reduced from DWP). (PSI, pp.10-11.) In 2014, he was twice charged with DUI in Wyoming;
although no disposition is listed for one of the charges and the other charge indicates that he was

1

PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file “PSI – filed 12-202016.pdf.”
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released to federal authorities, the PSI later notes that Anderson “‘has two pending DUI charges
in Wyoming.’” (PSI, pp.12-13.) Anderson was also charged with DUI in Idaho in 2014, of
which he was convicted and sentenced to prison. (PSI, pp.12-13.) He was paroled on May 27,
2015, after which he participated in substance abuse treatment at Four Directions Treatment
Center. (PSI, p.13.)
Despite the multitude of prior legal sanctions, opportunities on probation and parole,
rehabilitative programs including two riders and outpatient treatment, and the fact that he had
additional substance abuse treatment available through his tribe, Anderson once again chose to
endanger the community by committing the DUI in this case. (1/17/17 Tr., p.14, L.19 – p.15,
L.1.) In the instant offense, an officer observed Anderson driving “approximately 50 M.P.H. in a
posted 35 zone.” (PSI, p.40.) The officer pursued Anderson and observed him crash into the
back of the tow truck, which was stopped at a red light, while traveling at approximately 30
miles per hour. (PSI, p.40.) Anderson then “fell out of” his vehicle and was so intoxicated that
he was “unable to stand up without assistance.” (PSI, p.40.) Officers subsequently found an
open can of beer and an 18-count box of beer “with 8 beers missing” in Anderson’s vehicle.
(PSI, p.38.) According to the vehicle collision report, the damage to Anderson’s vehicle was
“Moderate-Severe” and the tow truck appeared to have “Minor-Moderate” damage. (PSI, pp.47,
49.) Anderson was “very verbally uncooperative and aggressive,” failed field sobriety testing,
and refused to submit to breath testing because, he stated, he “‘was drunk.’” (PSI, pp.38-39.)
Blood testing later revealed Anderson’s BAC was .221. (11/14/16 Tr., p.12, L.9; 1/17/17 Tr.,
p.20, Ls.7-9.) Contrary to Anderson’s assertion that he accepted responsibility for the offense,
Anderson repeatedly insisted that he drank only two or three beers, that he merely “bumped” the
tow truck and did not cause damage, and that the driver of the tow truck was at fault because, he
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claims, the tow truck was stopped at a green light and had no taillights. (PSI, p.4; 1/17/17 Tr.,
p.20, Ls.4-9; p.23, L.6 – p.24, L.11; p.25, Ls.7-8.) Anderson even went so far as to state that he
“fe[lt] like [he] was set up.” (1/17/17 Tr., p.24, Ls.2-3.) Anderson’s minimization of his
conduct and his ongoing attempts to blame others demonstrate his failure to accept full
responsibility for his criminal behavior – a prerequisite to successful rehabilitation.
At sentencing, the state addressed the seriousness of the offense, Anderson’s attempts to
blame others and minimize his criminal behavior, his ongoing DUI offending, the great risk he
poses to society, and his failure to rehabilitate or be deterred despite prior treatment opportunities
and legal sanctions. (1/17/17 Tr., p.18, L.18 – p.21, L.16 (Appendix A).) The district court
subsequently articulated the correct legal standards applicable to its decision and also set forth its
reasons for imposing Anderson’s sentence. (1/17/17 Tr., p.26, L.12 – p.31, L.15 (Appendix B).)
The state submits that Anderson has failed to establish that his sentence is excessive or that the
district court abused its discretion by declining to place him on probation, for reasons more fully
set forth in the attached excerpts of the sentencing hearing transcript, which the state adopts as its
argument on appeal. (Appendices A and B.)
Anderson next asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35
motion for a reduction of sentence because he did not violate his parole until he committed the
instant offense and he has employment available. (Appellant’s brief, pp.11-12.) If a sentence is
within applicable statutory limits, a motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for
leniency, and this court reviews the denial of the motion for an abuse of discretion. State v.
Huffman, 144 Idaho, 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). To prevail on appeal, Anderson must
“show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently
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provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion.” Id. Anderson has failed to
satisfy his burden.
Information with respect to Anderson’s performance on parole, ability to earn income,
and desire to continue working after his release from custody was before the district court at the
time of sentencing and, as such, it is not new information that entitled Anderson to a reduction of
sentence. (PSI, pp.13-16, 18.) Furthermore, these factors do not outweigh the seriousness of the
offense, the danger Anderson presents to the community, and his failure to rehabilitate or be
deterred. In its order denying Anderson’s Rule 35 motion, the district court stated:
… [T]his Court’s primary concern in sentencing Anderson was protection
of society. Anderson’s lengthy criminal record, his repeated convictions for
Driving Under the Influence, and his conviction in this case for Driving Under the
Influence while on parole from prison, and during which he caused property
damage culminated in this Court's decision to place Anderson in prison.
Assuming Anderson's probation officer would have testified that Anderson was
making progress does not change the fact that despite any progress, Anderson
again chose to get behind the wheel of a vehicle while in a state of intoxication.
… Anderson's inability to control his criminal behavior, despite progress on
parole, resulted in the sentence he now contests.
(Order Denying Rule 35 Motion, pp.9-10 (Augmentation).)

“When a court reasonably

determines that other sentencing objectives outweigh the goal of rehabilitation, the court does not
abuse its discretion in denying a motion for leniency under Rule 35.” State v. Moore, 131 Idaho
814, 825, 965 P.2d 174, 185 (1998).
In denying Bowser’s Rule 35 motion, the court adhered to its belief that the objectives of
protection of society and deterrence were the overriding factors in this case. The court noted that
“Anderson has been given lesser sentences in the past, programming, monitoring, and treatment.
He has shown that these have not curbed his criminal behavior,” and, “Anderson's record and
inability to follow through with prior programming, counseling, and treatment … determined his
sentence.” (Order Denying Rule 35 Motion, pp.9, 12 (Augmentation).) The district court

8

considered all of the relevant information and appropriately concluded that Anderson’s sentence
“was reasonable and supported by the record … and Anderson has shown no reason to change
it,” stating:
Anderson has participated in intense programming while on a previous Rider, he
has been counselled while on probation and parole, and he has been closely
monitored in a prior treatment program. These have not worked. Society is best
served when those who continue to make criminal choices after being given
repeated chances to rehabilitate their lives, are taken off the streets to prevent
future harm.
(Order Denying Rule 35 Motion, pp.12-13 (Augmentation).) Anderson has not shown that he
was entitled to a reduction of sentence simply because he is employable or because his
performance on parole was acceptable until he committed yet another DUI offense. Given any
reasonable view of the facts, Anderson has failed to establish that the district court abused its
discretion by denying his Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence.

Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Anderson’s conviction and sentence
and the district court’s order denying Anderson’s Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence.

DATED this 18th day of August, 2017.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming___________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

VICTORIA RUTLEDGE
Paralegal
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 18th day of August, 2017, served a true and correct
copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic copy to:
BEN P. MCGREEVY
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming___________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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APPENDIX A

1 without something that creates a great lasting effect, his

1 to and take advantage ofto help them in maintaining that

2 ability to maintain that for the rest of his life is going
3 to be limited.
4
Even with the number of those DUI's that are
5 present, Your Honor, I think that he is an individual who
6 can succeed with the proper tools.
7
Your nonor, I understand what Mr. Anderson is
8 saying, I guess, and I've heard it before, but there is
9 something about it that resonates with me. And I think
10 it's part of the theory of drug court as well, that
11 treatment for individuals when incarcerated, there's no
12 denying it has some benefit and they can get them some
13 skills. But when people receive treatment in an
14 incarcerated setting, what they are not receiving is how
15 to incorporate that treatment on a day to day basis. Ilow
16 to use it when they arc at home or around family or with a
17 bad neighbor or whatever the trigger may be that causes
18 them to relapse. Or friends that they used to know and
19 they run into at the store and who is a trigger for them.
20
What they are lacking in receiving treatment
21 in an incarcerated setting is treatment that teaches them
22 how to use those on the ground while running, so to speak.
23 To teach them how to use it on a day to day basis and
24 provide them with resources, Not only teaching them how
25 to use it, but providing them with resources to reach out

2 sobriety.
Your Honor, the court is correct that we
3
4 talked about DUl's and talk about the possibility of
5 someone getting hurt. I understand what the court is
6 saying there as well. There has been a property damage
7 accident that was involved here. I know -· I guess we
8 have some concerns with regard to the accident related to
9 the restitution. I realize restitution is irrespective of
10 whether the accident occurred or not. That doesn't take
11 away the fact that the accident occurred. But, Your
12 Honor, l think we are in a situation where an accident
13 occurred, but we are still talking about property damage,
14 which is significant and important to be addressed, and I
15 know Mr. Anderson wants to.
16
THE COURT: Mr. Colson, your statements and
17 recommendations.
18
MR. COLSON: Your Honor, as far as the restitution,
19 we received information, and I'm going off the notes in
20 our software, tha t indicates that the viltims have started
21 going in for medical treatments at this point, so we are
22 requesting 60 days from today's hearing for restitution
23 purposes to make sure and be able to inform the court as
24 to the types of injuries, the treatment, those types of
25 things that are occurring. In addition to that, make sure
18

17

1 that we have all of the correct victims in place,
2 including the insurance company.
THE COURT: Okay.
3
MR. COLSON: Your Honor, as to the recommendation
4
s part of the hearing, Your Honor, I'm very much
6 understanding of Mr. Ricks's argument with respect to the
7 treatment needed for Mr. Anderson. He does need
8 treatmen t. He probably needs treatment for the rest of
9 his life so he can not drink But the most apparent thing
10 at this point that l think is pressing for this court, and
11 pressing from the state's perspective, is looking at the
12 four factors of sentencing that this court has to look at,
13 that being protection of society, rehabilitation,
14 deterrence and punishment, I look at this individual's
15 record and it's time to protect the community.
16 Unfortunately, our community has been continually at risk
17 from this individual as is apparent from his criminal
18 history.
What the state is asking for here today is a
19
20 sentence that will protect society. The state is not
21 interested in the rehabilitation aspect at this point
22 He's had that opportunity. He's been to programming and
23 had those classes. He chose not to follow through with
24 the treatment he had, the tools that he was given.
He was a .221 in this case, BAC He wrecked
25

1 into another vehicle. Based on his version of the events
2 in this presentence investigation report, he wants to
3 claim it was because there was a taillight out on the
4 vehicle. He wants to put the hlame on someone else as to
5 why he wrecked into the vehicle, but not take
6 responsibility for the fact that·· he didn't drink three
7 beers with co-workers as he's trying to claim. I don't
8 know how many he consumed or what he consumed, but he
9 consumed a lot of alcohol to get to a .221.
It's not the drinking part that is going to
10
11 land him in prison, it's the fact this individual chooses
12 to get behind the wheel when he drinks and chooses to do
13 that on a regular basis. Unfortunately we don't have
14 individuals here that are deceased or injured, maimed to a
15 point where their lives will be forever affected. It
16 sounds like there's some treatmen t that may be needed, but
17 nothing that will hopefully be forever.
The fact of the matter is, if this individual
18
19 remains out in the community at some point he's going to
20 cost somebody their life. At some point he's going to
21 hurt somebody that will then affect them forever. I think
22 it's our responsibility to protect society, Your Honor.
l make the recommendation here today, Your
23
24 Honor, for, admittedly, a hefty sentence. I recommend 10
25 years, seven fixed and three indeterminate. I don't

20

19
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8
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11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

recommend that for punishment purposes to Mr. Anderson, I
don't recommend that out of disdain for Mr. Anderson. I
recommend that to protect the people in diis community. I
think that at this point he's shown that has to be done.
One and five didn't work. That didn't deter him. The
only way that this individual doesn't get behind the wheel
and drive when drunk is if he's incarcerated.
I'II just briefly cover this because the court
addressed it previously. That is, we're not talking about
someone who made a youthful mistake. I'm not justifying
those either, but we're talking about an individual that
has four felony convictions. And five, most likely,
looking at the NCIC from the Wyoming charges, but four
definitely. We're talking about an 11th conviction for
driving under the influence. I don't think he leaves
anybody any choice at this point.
Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Anderson, do you wish to make a
statement on your own behalf/
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do, sir.
THE COURT: Go ahead.
THE DEFENDANT: First, the prosecution sounds like
he wishes that I had hurt somebody. Too bad we didn't
have somebody here hurt that has to live with it for the
rest of their lives. What kind of man would say that and

1 wish that on somebody, that I had hurt somebody. That

2
3
4
5
6
7
8

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

ain't right. To me that sounds like a personal grudge
against me.
I understand I did wrong. I understand and I
take the responsibility for it. I know I need help. I
understand that. Just like what we've been talking about,
I took the classes in prison, but those classes aren't the
same. You go in there and they don't have it sitting
right there when you walk in the door at the store, you
know. Out here you deal with it day to day. When I get
out of the prison there, does that mean that that's going
to stop them from selling alcohol at the door when I walk
in? I can just walk in and grab some, you know.
I need help out here dealing with alcohol
availability. The stuff in there is home made stuff, you
know. It's hard to come by. I need something structured
in my life to help me be able to change. Alcohol is a
disease. It ain't something you just pick up and put down
if you feel like it. I understand that.
I'm 50 some years old and there's been times
that I have a lot of sobriety. I have done things in my
life. I've worked. I would ask the court to realize that
I'm not the little juvenile kid that he pointed out the
first time. I understand right from wrong. I understand
the next time I get in back of the wheel of a pickup or a
22

21

1 vehicle and I've been drinking, I understand the dangers;

2 I understand the consequences. It won't happen again.
3
I've put it-· I've told myself not to do it.
4 My mother had a hard life to live th rough. I don't want
S that. I put it to myself just like I put it to Mr. Ricks
6 earlier when he talked to me. Maybe it was a good thing
7 it was me who run into that truck with no taillights. Not
8 one taillight, not one. They had no lights on it in the
9 back. That vehicle was sitting on a green light. I
10 stopped at that first stop light. This vehicle was
11 sitting at the next one. I pulled forward and when the
12 light turned green on mine and it turned green all the way
13 down. And I was on my way to get something to eat.
14 That's why my alcohol level was so high on three beers and
15 an empty stomach.
16
When I pulled forward I looked over at the
17 Family Dollar and when I looked back that vehicle was
18 still there. That's why I bumped into them. I didn't
19 slam in like I'm doing a hundred miles an hour. I bumped
20 into him. I put on the brakes at the same time as I hit
21 him.
When I did that, I'm glad, maybe, in a way
22
23 that it was me because a family with children they might
24 have hurt themselves in a small car in that vehicle. I've
25 looked at it that way. I could have killed some kids with

1
2
3
4
S
6

7
8
9

10
11
12
13
14
15

16
17

18
19
20
21
22
23
24

25

the vehicle sitting like that in the middle of the road.
What I take it as in my mind, I feel like I
was set up. That vehicle, after it got run into, there
was nothing wrong. They want $12,000 saying that their
vehicle was damaged. They was able to hook my truck up
and tow it olT. That must have cables or something on
that for damage and them still being able to tow my truck
off with that vehicle.
There wasn't no ta illights or nothing. lfl
slammed it in the back they created a hazard on
themselves.
This is what I'm looking at. I've been
contemplating all of these months in jail thinking what I
did wrong. If I ever get a chance again I never am going
to do th is. I know that.
I was sober from the day I got out of prison,
15 months. I got kicked out. The reason I left is
because that's what Blaine said. I went to him because I
had some eagle feathers and I loaned them out to my
father-in-law. Well, they was trying to steal my stuff.
They did steal half of my stuff. All I got was my
furniture and stuff out there from the house. I got
kicked out.
So now I'm homeless and after about two weeks
of that, living like that, how do you trust? No money. A
24

23
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APPENDIX B

1 friend and I went up and got a couple loads of wood and
2 sold them and come back down and my nephew talked me int
3 drinking some beers with him. I was hungry. I'd drop
4 them others off. They was going home to eat. I didn't
5 have no home to go eat so I was headed to Roots to get
6 myself something to eat. That's when it happened.
7
Your Honor, I understand what those two beers
B did to me. I understand what a danger it did. I wish
9 that upon no one else. I just would like you to give me
10 the opportunity to change myself, you know. In prison you
11 are forced to change. How can I explain it to you in a
12 way that when you are forced into doing something, you got
13 the retaliation feeling, like I don't want to go to class.
14 I don't want to go. It's something that you resent going
15 to the classes when you are forced to.
16
But when you're out here in the community and
17 it's like I get to go to my AA meetings, go to this, do
18 that. You feel better about it. I feel that I've learned
19 more or appreciate it more being able to do it on my own,
20 being able to make myself go. Get on that bus. It only
21 costs a dollar. Make it to my appo intments and get
22 around. Help myself instead of being forced, you know.
23 Help my morale, help me look at myself as a better person
24 because I'm able to get up and do it myself instead of
25 being forced to do it.

1
2
3
4

5
6
7
8
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11
12
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15
16

17
18

19
20
21
22
23
24
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I think that's all.
THE COURT: Okay. Are you satisfied with the
representation Mr. Ricks has provided to you?
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah.
THE COURT: Do you know of any legal reason why I
should not sentence you today?
THE DEFENDANT: No.
TIIE COURT: Mr. Ricks, do you?
MR. RICKS: I do not.
THE COURT: Mr. Colson, do you?
MR. COLSON: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Anderson, based upon your guilty
plea of operating a motor vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol, drugs, or other intoxicating
substances, and having had at least one prior felony DUI
conviction within the previous 15 years, as outlined in
count one, part one, and part two of the infonnation, I've
reviewed your criminal history as set forth in the
presentence investigation report. As has been indicated,
the number of felonies in the presentence investigation
report is four. If you count the one that shows on the
NCIC it would be your fifth felony conviction. This is
your 11th DUI conviction. You've had a number of
misdemeanors and I don't know that it's necessary to count
them all, but it looks like about 25 all together.
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The presentence investigation report
recommends that you be incarcerated. The substance abuse
evaluation done in this case indicates that you need level
2.1 substance abuse treatment. There are no mental health
concerns.
In addition to the arguments made here today,
I've reviewed the objectives of c1iminal punishment which
includes protection of society, deterrence, rehabilitation
and punishment. I've reviewed the factors under Idaho
Code 19-2521 related to the question of whether I should
place you on probation or confine you to prison. You are
52 years of age. Your LSI score is a 26, which puts you
in the moderate risk category.
The things that are kind of an aggravation are
things that we have basically talked about here today. A
number ofDUI convictions, a number of felonies. And in
fact in this case this was an accident involved that
caused concern for the court. Your BAC level was over a
.20.
There are some things that you said that
bothered me a little bit, Mr. Anderson. I'm just going to
address some of those. Number one, I'm not going to
pretend to know or understand what it's like to not have a
home. I've been fortunate enough where I've been able to
be successful in the relationship with my spouse, though

1 that doesn't mean that we haven't had arguments. We've
2 had plenty of arguments.
3
If you're homeless and you've got money that
4 you are making, you chose, rather than to invest that
S money wisely and try to find someplace to live, to spend
6 it on alcohol. And you used that excuse to go ahead and
7 drink.
8
The other concern that I have is that you made
9 the statement here that your nephew talked you into
10 drinking. Unless he pointed a gun at your head and said
11 drink or else, you made the decision to drink. I
12 understand a little bit about addiction and I understand
13 that triggers that can cause to you react without
14 thinking. But you have a history here where you should
15 have known the risk of that decision. It should he clear
16 to you by now, with your history and with your age, you
17 can't touch it.
l8
In addition to that, you then continually make
19 the decisions to get behind the wheel after you drink. I
20 think everybody in this room who heard what has been said
21 here today, and everybody who has read the presentence
22 investigation report, will agree that you shouldn't drink,
23 but if you do that's not the problem, the problem is you
24 then make the decision to get heh ind the wheel of a motor
25 vehicle and drive. You can't do that because you then put
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the community at risk, including yourself.
The other thing that I will address is your
history in relation to treatment. You have had some
treatment through the criminal system. And I understand
completely that treatment, and nobody will disagree,
treatment will work better in a community setting rather
than in a confined setting, but that doesn't mean that
every case, no matter what, a person should be treated in
a community setting. It doesn't work like that.
Given your history and your times on
probation, your time on parole, even if you are off
probation or parole, you know your history and you know
your addiction and what you need to do. It's within your
control and your·· it's your decision whether to seek
additional treatment to prevent it from happening in the
future.
It's not the state's responsibility to hold
your hand your entire life and say you got to do this and
do that unless you're within our jurisdiction. You know,
unless you're on probation or parole. And even then we
can't force it. We have a big stick to say if you don't
you'll end up back in prison, but you're the one that
eventually has to take advantage of those programs even in
a prison setting.
You know the risk when you get out. You'll be
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flooded with influences and friends who live a lifestyle
that you can't. You'll run into things that are going to
trigger that desire to drink and you just have to take the
opportunity on your own to get that treatment. You know
where it will take you otherwise.
I'm a little concerned as well about your
statement·· I'm not going to set here and make a
determination of who is at faul t in this accident, if
there were no taillights or were taillight.~, but at the
same time your inebriation contributed to the accident
because nobody knows what the reaction time would have
been if you'd have been sober. I question the allegation
that you feel that you were set up. That's just reaching,
in my mind, trying to justify why you shouldn't go to
prison.
No matter what happens today, if you end up
going to prison or if you're in some other type of
structured setting where you're supposed to do treatment,
l guess if you want to be resentful, you can be, but
you're not going to get it if that's how you approach it
no matter what happens. The ultimate decisio n is yours.
Take advantage of whatever programs are given to you. And
if they're not given to you take advantage of what you can
through other resources that you may have on your own. If
that means you are out on probation or parole or free
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1 othe1wise, get into a program to help you deal with it
2 That's your responsibility. You are in charge of your
3 life until you violate the law.
4
Mr. Anderson, I feel for you, I really do.
5 It's unfortunate that something like alcohol has destroyed
6 somebody's life the way it has yours.
7
Mr. Colson is right, that at this point we
8 have to protect society. You have continued over the
9 years to be a danger to society. Therefore, it is the
10 judgment of this court that you be sentenced to the Idaho
11 Department of Corrections for a fixed and determinate
12 period of six years and an indeterminate period of four
13 years. In other words, not less than six nor more than
14 1O. That sentence will run consecutive to any other
15 charge that you are currently on parole for.
16
Your fine is in the amount of$3,000. Court
17 costs arc $290.50. You'll reimburse the county for the
18 services of the public defender in the amount of $500.
19 Your driving privileges are suspended for a period of five
20 years following release from incarceration. You'll then
21 be required to have an interlock device placed on any
22 vehicle that you operate, after your license is
23 reinstated, for a period of five years.
You are ordered to provide a DNA sample and
24
25 thumbprint to the state pursuant to statute. The court
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will hold restitution open for 60 days. Mr. Colson,
you'll be requ ired to lile an amended motion for
restitution within that period oftime. Mr. Ricks, 45 or
60 days to respond?
MR. RICKS: Sixty, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Ricks, you'll have 60 days to
respond. If there's no response I'll consider that a
stipulation to the request and I'll order restitution. If
there's an objection, the court will then set the matter
for a hearing. If there's a stipulation I'll sign the
order as stipulated to.
Do you understand the sentence, sir?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. How many years total?
THE COURT: Ten total.
THE DEFENDANT: Six years fixed?
THE COURT: Yes.
THE DEFENDANT: On my last sentencing I still have
something left.
THE COURT: I don't know what you have left on the
other one. IDOC can tell you that. That is to run
consecutive.
You are advised that you have the right to
appeal that decision. That appeal has to be filed within
42 days. You also have the right to be represented by
counsel on that appeal. If you cannot afford counsel, you
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